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Robertson, William Glenn. River of Death: The Chickamauga Campaign: Vol. I
The Fall of Chattanooga. University of North Carolina Press, $45.00 ISBN
9781469643120
Robertson sets the scene for the Union's only major defeat in the Western Theater mainly
by giving the fog of war its due, especially that part emanating from flawed staff work, poor
communication, and personal grudges. Although this first volume stops short of the culminating
battle, he helps us see through some of that fog. First, by providing background information on
every commander in the contending armies down to brigade and sometimes regimental level, he
elucidates the human factor as few recent campaign histories have. Second, a painstakingly
detailed day-by-day narrative enables the reader to understand what commanders knew and when
they knew it: the author's stated intention. That a supervisor of numerous Command and
General Staff College Chickamauga staff rides would seek to understand a battle by
understanding the campaign that hatched it will surprise no one. Shedding light on the
generalship of William S. Rosecrans and Braxton Bragg by eliminating hindsight also points to
the author's qualifications as a teacher of combat arms leaders. But if the author's method comes
as no surprise, the degree to which it succeeds might. After all, his conscious effort to upgrade
the clueless Bragg of Thomas Connelly and Grady McWhiney suggests a preconception or two
of its own.
Robertson's Bragg, like Steven E. Woodworth's, remains the "naturally disputatious"
character noted in Grant's memoirs as well as the victim of disloyal and/or incompetent corps
commanders called out in their earlier works, most notably Woodworth's Jefferson Davis and
His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West (1990). Even readers who
prefer the perpetually flummoxed Bragg to Robertson's competent if irascible professional must
admit that Joseph Wheeler's aversion to aggressive and timely reconnaissance blinded Bragg at
crucial moments. So, too, do Rosecrans's tendencies toward nervousness and micromanagement
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remain as before. The self-righteousness afflicting both generals has also attracted
previous comment, although readers of this most recent work may yet wonder how much of that
self-righteousness stemmed from the "theateritis" prevailing in Richmond and Washington.
River of Death's original and indispensable contribution is its flood of details – details wherein
the devil truly lurked.
Having convinced us that ad hominem swipes at army commanders offer only an
artificially easy way out, Robertson outlines systemic problems originating with their respective
staffs and subordinate commanders. Bragg chose a similarly qualified professional, West Point
classmate William Mackall, as his chief of staff. Mackall understood his commander's quirks
better than most, but his ability to manage his staff suffered, as Bragg often maintained closer
working relationships with his more junior aides de camp. Instead of consistently assigning
personnel, intelligence, operations, and supply functions to the same staff officers, he used those
officers interchangeably and often fatigued himself by performing their duties when the Army of
Tennessee's operational pace was at its quickest. Not only were individual staff responsibilities
poorly defined, but few of Bragg's staff officers had brought like experience with them. The lack
of army level signal and railroad organizations and Bragg's micromanagement sometimes
compounded that problem, while Assistant Adjutant General George Brent's intercessions and
the overall loyalty of Bragg's staff occasionally mitigated it.
The author's detailed profiles of Bragg's major subordinate commanders reveal a far more
troubling picture: Not only did Leonidas Polk wangle a corps command despite a total lack of
military experience (other than his cadet years at West Point), but his disloyalty and ability to
spread it among more competent peers figures more prominently in Robertson's analysis than
any of Bragg's miscues. Cronyism and egotism, far less attributable to any one person with the
possible exception of Jefferson Davis, was the culture in which such a virus thrived. As for the
paralyzed Bragg of Connelly and McWhiney, Robertson's attention to Confederate shortages in
rations and bridging capability yields at least a partial rehabilitation: Whatever his flaws, Bragg
was in no position to do anything but let Rosecrans cross the Tennessee River before delivering a
counterpunch of his own.
Not that the bluecoats were free of bickering, self-serving connivers. Indeed, readers will
find ample overlap of careerism and professionalism in the Army of the Cumberland as well,
especially because its commanding general had a disputatious streak of his own. Rosecrans's
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outmaneuvering of Bragg during the Tullahoma Campaign had only reinforced twin tendencies:
to dismiss Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton and General in Chief Henry W. Halleck as
uninformed meddlers, and to believe in his own infallibility. Such was likely to drain any
reservoir of toleration in Washington, and it also set an unfortunate example in Rosecrans's own
command. Robertson's most compelling display of dueling egos is the 7-8 September "blind
obedience" controversy involving Thomas L. Crittenden (XXI Corps) and one of his division
commanders, Thomas J. Wood – the same Thomas J. Wood whose literal interpretation of an
obviously incorrect order would bring about the Union collapse at Chickamauga not two weeks
later. In this earlier episode, however, Crittenden favored the more literal interpretation of
Rosecrans's orders for a reconnaissance in force toward Lookout Mountain and Wood, convinced
that his division was already overextended, one that afforded more tactical flexibility and
therefore a smaller commitment of troops. An outpouring of mutual recrimination ensued even
though the Army of the Cumberland was dispersed over a 30 mile front in a valley with a
mountain to its rear and no reliable intelligence on the enemy to its front.
Flaws in staff work also offset Federal advantages in logistical support and initiative.
Although no career military professional, Army of the Cumberland Chief of Staff James A.
Garfield was equally convinced of his own infallibility and, at times, given to siding with
Washington behind Rosecrans's back whenever higher headquarters believed progress too slow.
Many of Garfield's staff officers were twenty-somethings who had served with Rosecrans in
Mississippi without prior staff experience. Worst of all, their staff only functioned from noon to
midnight, largely because the commander rarely arose before 10 a.m.; an arrangement that could
not possibly have worked well in the field, even without the two hours of socializing that
followed in the wee hours of the morning. Accordingly, Robertson argues with considerable
traction that the consequent sleep deficit not only hindered staff work, but a micromanaging
commander incapable of self-criticism.
That a lack of sleep may have caused Rosecrans to lose confidence in his own judgment
when he was actually right is the most stinging of ironies. Early in the morning of 9 September,
he heard of Chattanooga's evacuation and ordered an all-out pursuit of the Army of Tennessee,
but at that point the picture blurs. We do know that Rosecrans met with George H. Thomas,
whose XIV Corps was to play a key role in the upcoming push, but neither man left a record of
the meeting. Robertson tentatively fills in the blank with a reference to the postwar account of
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XIV Corps Chaplain Thomas Van Horne. Van Horne was not present at that crucial meeting but
later wrote a history of the Army of the Cumberland at Thomas's behest. According to Van
Horne, Thomas recommended that Rosecrans consolidate his scattered army before attempting
any pursuit and exploitation. Rosecrans agreed that the advice was sound but insisted on pursuit
nevertheless because his superiors expected it. Robertson handles the Van Horne account
carefully enough, noting that the more conservative course was in character for Thomas and that
the War Department's tendency to needle Rosecrans is also an established fact. It is indeed likely
that the Federals then forged ahead into un-reconnoitered territory because Rosecrans had at long
last – and at the worst possible moment – caved in to pressure from Washington. While Lincoln
famously held that Rosecrans seemed "confused and stunned like a duck hit on the head" in the
wake of Chickamauga, the orders of 9 September mark the beginning of that downfall.
His victory of 19-20 September still eleven days away, Bragg's loss of Chattanooga has
usually drawn more fire than Rosecrans's consequent leap into the dark. Robertson's dismissal of
McWhiney and Connelly is especially on point here. They and numerous others have taken
Bragg to task for stupidly expecting the main enemy crossing of the Tennessee to take place
upriver from Chattanooga even after several Union divisions had crossed downriver. Instead,
Robertson emphasizes the shortage of intelligence coming to Bragg's headquarters from both
sectors. Informed mostly by unknowns, Bragg's decision not to contest the downriver crossings
was therefore the only prudent choice that could have been made. Sufficient knowledge of
Union dispositions was clearly unavailable when Bragg needed it, and a wrong guess could have
been fatal.
By attending to concrete details – areas not reconnoitered, copying and transmittal time
for field orders, spot reports eagerly awaited but never sent, overstretched supply lines, collapsed
bridges, railroad construction setbacks, and inexcusable bickering while in harm's way –
Robertson reminds us of what zero defects historiography and Monday morning quarterbacks
will not: that generalship is all too often a game of bind man's bluff. In the end, we who
celebrate history's successful gambles must also give credit to leaders who could tell a good bet
from a bad one.

JOHN DALEY is a former Armor officer who teaches the military history courses at Pittsburg
State University in southeastern Kansas.
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